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Ticoras: Quality Control of Court-Appointed Counsel

THE OHIO SUPREME COURT'S MOVE TOWARD
QUALITY CONTROL OF COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL
FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS CHARGED
WITH CAPITAL OFFENSE CRIMES
The Ohio Supreme Court has moved to improve the quality of legal representation for indigent defendants facing the death penalty.' Common Pleas Superintendent Rule 65 (hereinafter C.P.Sup.R. 65)2 is a three-part rule used to determine and regulate the minimum standard qualifications required for an attorney
to be eligible for court-appointment as legal counsel for indigent defendants
charged with capital offense crimes.3 C.P.Sup.R. 65 delineates the specific eligibility requirements for court-appointed counsel, both on the trial 5 and the
appellate level .6 The Rule also establishes the Committee on the Appointment
of Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Capital Cases (hereinafter Oversight Committee) and provides guidelines for its operation. 7 Finally, the Rule identifies
the proper procedure for appointing counsel, 8 for notifying the Oversight Committee of the appointment9 and for providing support services to counsel.i 0
The Rule itself is unique because it is the first of its kind designed specifically to enhance the quality of court-appointed counsel for indigent capital defendants."I Justice Andrew Douglas' concern over ineffective assistance of counsel
in capital offense cases, especially after the decision in State v. Johnson, 2 sparked
* Prof. Margery Koosed and the author would be willing to answer any questions about the new rule.
ICOMMON PLEAS SUPERINTENDENCE RULE 65 (Baldwin 1987).

2Included with the Rule are "Committee" and "Subcommittee" Comments. The Ohio State Bar Association Subcommittee on the Appointment of Counsel for Indigents in Capital Cases formulated C.P.SuP.R.
65 and submitted the draft to the Ohio State Bar Association, which approved the rule and forwarded
it to the Ohio Supreme Court. The Comments, the workproduct of the Subcommittee, should be changed
to one title and are referred to in this Comment as "Committee Comments." See Letter from Professor
Margery Koosed to Mr. Stephen Stover (Sept. I, 1987) (discussing appropriate revisions to the then proposed C.P.SuP.R. 65).
3
1d.
4
C.P.SuP.R. 65 (1) (Baldwin 1987).
5

C.P.SuP.R. 65 (1)(A) (Baldwin 1987).
C.P.SuP.R. 65 (I)(B) (Baldwin 1987).
7C.P.SuP.R. 65 (II) (Baldwin 1987), covers the selection procedure for the Oversight Committee created
by the Rule.
8C.P.SuP.R. 65 (III)(A) (Baldwin 1987).
9
C.P.SuP.R. 65 (II1)(B) (Baldwin 1987).
10 C.P.SUPR. 65 (111)(C) (Baldwin 1987).
" Letter from Justice Andy Douglas to Duke Thomas, President, Ohio State Bar Association (June 18,
1986) (suggesting standards for training of counsel to curb ineffective assistance of counsel).
1224 Ohio St. 3d 87, 494 N.E.2d 1061 (1986) (Defendant's conviction and penalty were reversed after
the court found ineffective assistance of counsel denied Defendant a fair trial and violated his due process
rights).
6
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the Ohio State Bar Association (hereinafter O.S.B.A.) Criminal Justice Committee to form the Subcommittee on the Appointment of Counsel for Indigents
in Capital Cases to address the problem. 3 The efforts of the Subcommittee,
approved by the O.S.B.A., and later by the Ohio Supreme Court, became
4
C.P.Sup.R. 65.1

This comment outlines the law in Ohio concerning court-appointed representation of indigent defendants in capital offense cases. A brief look at Ohio's
"pre-C.P.Sup.R. 65" period provides the proper backdrop in which to examine
C.P.Sup.R. 65's relation to the Ohio Public Defender's Regulations 5 and the
impact this rule may have throughout the State.1 6
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS IN CAPITAL CASES: THEIR RIGHTS AND

THE

LAW IN

OHIO

8
Concepts of "fundamental fairness"' require that an indigent defendant'
be provided with effective counsel. Unless waived, the appointment of counsel
is mandatory in trials where the indigent defendant is charged with a capital
offense.' 9 The sixth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution provide protection from any encroachment of these rights 20 These rights
are similarly protected in article I, section 10 of the Ohio Constitution, which
guarantees due process rights to all persons in Ohio.2 1 In Ohio, there has been

7

13Report of the Subcommittee on the Appointment of Counsel for Indigents in Caiptal Cases, p. ii (Feb.
21, 1987).
41Letter from Professor Margery Koosed, supra note 2.
15OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 120-1 et seq. (1987). These Administrative provisions provide the standards for
Public Defenders' qualifications, workload limitations and related requirements. Authority is given for
this Code Section pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN- § 111.15 (Anderson Supp. 1987). OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 120.01, et seq. (Anderson Supp. 1987) establish the Public Defender Commission of Ohio for the
State and counties.
16
The National Legal Aid and Defender Association has prepared Standards for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Dec. 1, 1987) for adoption in all states with the death penalty.
This Comment is limited to C.P.SuP.R. 65's origin and its likely impact in Ohio.
"See 17 0. Jur. 3d Const. Law § 649 (1987); The standard of "fundamental fairness" appeared in Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), where that fourteenth amendment analysis at the time prevailed, later
being reprocessed as part of the "selective incorporation" of the sixth amendment through the fourteenth
amendment. LAFAVE. ISRAEL. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.1 (1985).
"I1n Ohio, the determination of indigency is made pursuant to OHIO REV.CODE ANN. §§ 120.05 and 120.15
(Anderson 1984) and OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 120-1-13 (1987): See OHIO CRIM. R. 44 (Appointment of
Counsel); See also Annotation, Determination of Indigency of Accused Entitling Him to Appointment of
Counsel, 51 A.L.R.3d 1108 (1973).

19Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948). See 25 0. Jur. 3d Crim. Law § 145 (1987). The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that a defendant in a capital case needs "the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him." Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
The technical assistance needed in capital cases requires the presence of attorneys "to assume rights
are fully protected and the trial is fair." See 29 0. Jur. 3d Crim. Law § 1444 (1987). Although mandatory
offering of counsel is required to be available, a defendant is not required to take advantage of these rights
provided the trial court makes sufficient inquiry to ascertain that the defendant fully understands and intelligently relinquishes the right. State v. Gibson, 45 Ohio St. 3d 366, 345 N.E.2d 399 (1976).
21
Ohio Const. art. I, § 10.
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a statutory right to appointed counsel since 1816.22 Appointed counsel cannot
refuse to represent an indigent defendant 23 without facing possible contempt
24
charges.
Although fundamental errors are always reversible, 25 in Ohio, a presump27
26
tion exists that court-appointed counsel is competent and not inexperienced.
The burden of showing a violation of due process rests on the shoulders of
the defendant. 28 The inherent problem this presents is whether an indigent defendant will be able to recognize if a due process violation has occurred because
of the ineffective assistance of his or her counsel. Ironically, the persons in
the best position to recognize such a violation, are the appointed counsel
themselves. Indigent and unable to procure counsel independent of the county
or the state, the defendant literally has nowhere else to turn. For this reason,
the initial appointment of competent counsel for an indigent defendant, especially
in capital cases, is vital to prevent ineffective representation and a possible violation of the defendant's due process rights.
Ohio courts, recognizing the inherent problems with ineffective lawyers,
have stated that a court should appoint experienced, competent lawyers. 29 In
Ohio, appointment of counsel is not meant to be an empty formality.30 The court
must inform a defendant of his or her court-appointed counsel. Once appointed,
counsel has wide latitude to choose among trial tactics, such as deciding not
to call witnesses at the trial 2 Trial tactics are not reversible. 3 3 Some courts
have held that a counsel's representation is reversible only if the representation
was so ineffective that it was as if there had been no legal representation at
all 4 Prior to C.P.Sup.R. 65, no statute or court rule concerning qualified courtappointed counsel was in effect. Standards of review in Ohio remained vague
interpretations of case law.
22Conlan v. Haskins, 177 Ohio St. 65, 202 N.E.2d 419 (1964) cert. denied 381 U.S. 940 (1965) (citing
14 Ohio Laws, pp. 380, 384). However, there is no duty to appoint counsel to non-indigent defendants.
State ex rel v. Hennessey, 37 Ohio St. 2d 37, 306 N.E.2d 421 cert. denied 417 U.S. 946 (1974).
23"We hold it to be the obligation of experienced criminal practitioners to accept appointment to represent
indigent defendants in appeals." State v. Toney, 23 Ohio App. 2d 203, 206, 262 N.E.2d 419, 422 (1970).
24
See Annotation, Attorney's Refusal to Accept Appointment to Defendant Indigents, or to Proceed in Such
Defense, 36 A.L.R.3d 1221 (1971).
25Weisenberg v. State, 12 Ohio App. 272 (1920).
26
Vaugh v. Maxwell, 2 Ohio St. 2d 299, 209 N.E.2d 164 (1965); State v. Williams, 19 Ohio App. 2d 234,
250 N.E.2d 907 (1969).
"7State v. Knight, 77 Ohio App. 214, 66 N.E.2d 645, appeal dismissed, 146 Ohio St. 130, 64 N.E.2d
323 (1945), cert. denied, 237 U.S. 808, rehg denied, 328 U.S. 878 (1946).
28
Williams, 19 Ohio App. 2d 234, 250 N.E.2d 907.
29Toney, 23 Ohio App. 2d 203, 262 N.E.2d 419.
30

See 25 0. Jur. 3d Crim. Law § 304 (1987).
31In re Motz, 100 Ohio App. 296 (1955).
32State v. Sandy, 6 Ohio App. 3d 37, 452 N.E.2d 515 (1982).
33State v. Hunt, 20 Ohio App. 3d 310, 486 N.E.2d 108 (1984).
34
Kramer
v. Alvia, 103 Ohio App.
324, 141 N.E.2d 489 (1956); State v. Shelton, 16 Ohio Misc. 27, 239
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1988
N.E.2d 258 (1968).
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STATE V. JOHNSON
SPRINGBOARD

To C.P.SuP.R.65

In 1986, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Johnson,3" holding that
defense counsel's failure to object when a non-statutory aggravating factor in
the penalty phase of a capital case was submitted to the jury, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel ?6 The Court further held that the trial court's refusal
to grant a continuance, where new evidence arose on the first day of trial, de37
prived the defendant of a fair trial.
Johnson was the launching pad for C.P.Sup.R. 65. In Johnson," the defendant was indicted for the aggravated murder 39 of a desk clerk at the Reno Hotel
in Cleveland, Ohio 4 Before the jury selection, defense counsel asked the court
for a continuance, informing it that new evidence had been discovered: there
were persons inside the hotel at the time of the murder and defense counsel
had not had an opportunity "to ascertain their identities or otherwise investigate
them." 4' Defense counsel requested one week to examine the evidence 4 2 The
trial judge refused to grant the continuance "inview of defense counsel's expertise and experience in criminal cases" 4 3 and because the prosecution's
evidence was only circumstantial.44 The trial judge found no compelling reason
5
for granting the continuance.0
After the trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all charges and specific
aggravating factors 6 Defense counsel then asked for only a ten minute break
to explain the penalty phase of the proceeding to the defendant in order "to
consider what action [defense counsel] would like for him to take." 47 After the
break, the hearing was scheduled for the next morning 48
1524 Ohio St. 3d 87, 494 N.E.2d 1061 (1986).
36
1d.
37d.
38

1d.
39Defendant "was indicated for aggravated murder with two specifications: (1)that appellant was committing or attempting or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery,
and (2) that appellant had a firearm on or about his person or under his control." Id. at 87, 494 N.E.2d
at 1062.
40
Id.
41

The record indicated that defense counsel may have had five months to investigate the new evidence.
Id. at 105, 494 N.E.2d at 1075 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
4
21d. at 87, 494 N.E.2d at 1062.
43

1d. at 88, 494 N.E.2d at 1062.
441d. at 87, 494 N.E.2d at 1062.
45Defense Counsel also made an alternative motion to be excused from the case. Counsel asserted that
they could not provide appellant with effective assistance of counsel. The court also overruled this motion.
Id. at 88, 494 N.E.2d at 1062.
46
Id.
47

1d.

48Id.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss4/7
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At the penalty hearing, the defense produced only the unsworn testimony
of the defendant, while the prosecution produced four exhibits and examined
two witnesses. 49 The jury recommended the death penalty and the trial court
adopted the jury's recommendations." The appellate court affirmed the sentence
5
and conviction. 1
In the majority opinion, Justice Clifford Brown stated that Johnson was
"denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel." 52 The majority
found that defense counsel had failed to investigate the defendant's background
for mitigation evidence and therefore failed to present any such evidence at
the penalty phase of the trial.5 3 The Court stated that these failures in themselves
do not "constitute proof of ineffective assistance of counsel or deprivation of
the accused's right to a fair trial,"5 4 and recognized that there might exist tactical, well-planned reasons for not providing mitigation evidence "completely
consonant with [counsel's] duties to represent the accused effectively."'5 5 However,
the Court listed eight mitigating circumstances that defense counsel did not
use at all,5 6 "illustrat[ing] the utter lack of informed, calculated decision-making"
57
on the part of the defense counsel.
Defense counsel also failed to object to the prosecution's submission to
the jury, during both the guilt and the penalty stages of the evidence of possession of a firearm as an aggravating factor.5 8 The Court found that the prosecutorial
evidence admitted violated statutory law5 9 and that it was a reversible error.60
The majority also admonished the trial court for its failure to grant a
continuance 6 1 stating that refusal to allow investigation of vital facts "substantially prejudiced [Defendant's] ability to present a complete defense, and deprived
him of the effective assistance of counsel. ' 62 The Court thereby found blame
in the effective assistance of counsel in both the court and the counsel themselves.
49

1d.

5Old .
5

1Id.
11Id. at 88, 494 N.E.2d at 1063.
531d

54

.

1d. at 91, 494 N.E.2d at 1065.

55

Id.

56

d. (footnote 5). These included Defendant's marriage and family, his battle with and eventual triumph
over drug abuse and the fact that he turned himself in voluntarily to the police upon hearing of the warrant
for his arrest.
571d. at 92, 494 N.E.2d at 1065.
58

1d.
See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A) (Anderson 1984).
60However, the court went through lengths to determine this analysis of statutory violation. Id. at 92-93,
494 N.E.2d at 1065-66. Would counsel at the trial stage be prepared to know arguments to keep the evidence
from being admitted?
61 Id. at 94-95, 494 N.E.2d at 1067-68.
62
Id. at 95, 494 N.E.2d at 1068.
59
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Justice Wright, concurring in part and dissenting in part, placed more blame
on the trial court: "I think the trial court's failure to provide counsel reasonable
time and opportunity to prepare and present evidence in mitigation of the im. . .A duty
position of the death penalty was a clear denial of due process
63
rests on the court to see the accused's rights are upheld.
Justice Douglas dissented,6 4 finding that "there is simply no sound legal
65
basis upon which to overrule both the trial and appellate courts' decision.
In a lengthy restatement of the facts, Justice Douglas emphasized that defense

counsel had handled the case for five months,66 stressing that: (1) defendant
was granted change of counsel and given a new attorney of record "specifically chosen" by defendant; 67 (2) the "new evidence" was available to defense

counsel since discovery; 6 8 and, (3) the continuance was the third one which
had been requested.6 9 Justice Douglas found that the submission of the non-

statutory aggravating circumstances admitted into trial without objection did
not deny defendant a fair trial and defense counsel's assistance did not violate
due process 7 Justice Douglas therefore saw no reason to set aside the convic7t
tion or the death sentence.
Justice Douglas did see a need to curb the incidence of ineffective assistance
of court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases. On June
18, 1986, the day that the Johnson opinion was released for publication, Justice
Douglas wrote the O.S.B.A. and the Ohio Public Defender's Office expressing

concern over this problem.72 Disagreeing with the majority's finding of effective assistance of counsel in the Johnson case,73 Justice Douglas suggested "that

it is time for us to set some standards for training counsel and handling [death
63

1d. at
1d. at
65
1d. at
66Id. at
64

67

/d.

6SId

69

98-99, 494 N.E.2d at 1070-71 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100, 494 N.E.2d at 1072 (Douglas, I., dissenting).
103, 494 N.E.2d at 1075 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
105, 494 N.E.2d at 1075 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

.

1d. at 109, 494 N.E.2d at 1078 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).

70

One basis for Justice Douglas's decision is his interpretation of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). In Strickland, a two-part test is established for determining whether there has been effective assistance
of counsel: Was the counsel's assistance reasonable considering all circumstances and is there a reasonable
probability the result of the proceeding would have been different? Id. at 694. Justice Douglas found that
defendant's claim did not meet the second part of the test. Johnson, 24 Ohio St. 3d 87, 106, 494 N.E.2d
1061, 1076 (1986) (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
Justice Douglas also does not believe the admission of non-statutory aggravating circumstances warrants reversal because of a denial of a fair trial. Id. For an analysis of Strickland and the sixth amendment
rights to counsel for indigents, see Note, Wilson v. Mintzes: A Case of Ineffective Assistance or Denial
of Counsel of Choice? 17 U. TOL. L. REv. 615 (Spring 1986).
71
Id. at 100, 494 N.E.2d at 1072 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
72
Letter from Justice Douglas, supra note 11.
73
Johnson, 24 Ohio St. 3d at 100, 494 N.E.2d at 1072 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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penalty cases] and provide a procedure for that training and for the selecting
of lawyers" involved in that type of case.74 Justice Douglas' suggestion of standardizing the competency levels required of court-appointed counsel was the
beginning of C.P.Sup.R. 65. The President-elect of the O.S.B.A. contacted the
Criminal Justice Committee 75 about this issue. The Criminal Justice Committee then appointed a Subcommittee comprised of attorneys in Ohio with special
knowledge involving capital punishment cases.7 6 This Subcommittee focused
solely on capital cases where the court appointed attorneys for indigent defen7
dants?
While this process was evolving, the Judicial Conference of the Eighth
Judicial District adopted a proposal to amend the court rules. It mandated that
court-appointed attorneys for indigent defendants charged with a capital offense
in Cuyahoga County Courts who are appealing such cases into the Eighth Appellate Judicial District of Ohio, must have successfully completed at least five
hours of a continuing legal education seminar dealing specifically with defending capital cases.7!8 C.P.Sup.R. 65 goes far beyond the Cuyahoga County and
Eighth District Court Rules. C.P.Sup.R. 65 requires actual experience in specific
types of criminal cases 79 before the court may appoint an attorney for an indigent defendant charged with a capital crime.80
After the Ohio Supreme Court enacted C.P.Sup.R. 65, Chief Justice Moyer
stated, "Ohio is the first state in the nation to adopt a mandatory rule establishing
standards for the appointment of counsel for indigents in death penalty cases.
This demonstrates the Supreme Court's commitment to maintaining and en81
hancing the skills of lawyers who represent indigent clients in capital cases.

14Letter

from Justice Douglas, supra note 11.The letter continues: "The reasons for such a suggestion
would appear obvious, the most important being, of course, that defendants so charged should have the
most able of attorneys, properly trained in this specialty, to represent them as they stand trial for their
very life." Id. at 1.
75Report of the Subcommittee on the Appointment of Counsel, supra note 13.
761d. This membership includes, among others, a professor of law, general practitioners and a National
Legal Aid and Defender Association liaison. Id. at i.
771d. at ii.
78Cuyahoga County Rule 33 (I) § I (E) -(F) (1987): Local Rules of Eighth Appellate Judicial District
(1987) which reads in pertinent part:
No Lawyer may be assigned to represent on appeal a defendant sentenced to death unless the lawyer
has successfully completed a continuing legal education seminar respecting the defense and/or appeal of capital cases during the year prior to his appointment. The successfully completed seminar
shall be sponsored by a qualified criminal defense organization or bar association and compromise
a minimum of five hours of instruction on the defense and/or appeal of capital cases.
79C.P.Sup.R. 65 (1)(A)(2)(d); (I)(A)(3)(b); (I)(B)(c) (Baldwin 1987).
8
°There are exceptions in C.P.Sup.R. 65 to the requirement of specific trial experience. C.P.SuP.R. 65
(1)(A)(4) and (I)(B)(3) (Baldwin 1987).
8ROhio Supreme Court Press Release (Oct. 15, 1987).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1988

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 21 [1988], Iss. 4, Art. 7
[Vol. 21:4

AKRON LAW REVIEW

THE RULE ITSELF
EXAMINING C.PSuP.R.

65

The state has a great interest in implementing C. P.Sup.R. 65.82 C. P.Sup.R.
65 is implemented through the rule-making power granted to the Supreme Court
of Ohio by the State Constitution.8 3 The Ohio Constitution specifically provides for the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of superintendence over all
of Ohio. 4 Although the Preface to the Rules of Superintendence for Common
Pleas Courts states that the Rules are made for the benefit of the public, 5 a
benefit to the courts will also arise. Hopefully, C.P.Sup.R. 65 will reduce the
number of reversals and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
C.P.Sup.R. 65 is divided into three parts. Part I of this rule deals with the
qualifications needed for court-appointment of counsel; Part II establishes and
empowers the Oversight Committee; and, Part III outlines the procedures for
court-appointment .86
Part I, which establishes minimum qualifications needed for courtappointment, is based on the Ohio Public Defender Commission's requirements
as set forth in the Ohio Administrative Code Section 120--10. 7 However, the

Administrative Code requirements are not mandatory, and the Committee Comments to C.P.Sup.R. 65(I) indicate that "significant" numbers of court-appointed
counsel may fall beneath the minimum required standard. 8
Both C.P.Sup.R. 65 and Ohio Administrative Code Section 120-1-10 require that the defendant be provided with two attorneys for the trial,89 that the
counsel be admitted to the Ohio bar or be admitted to practice pro hac vice 90
and the lead counsel has to have at least three years of litigation experience 9 '
8
State v. Hill. 12 Ohio St. 2d 88, 232 N.E.2d 394 (1967); "In a criminal case, the interest of the state
and its citizens is involved as well as the interest of the accused. Ascertainment of the truth is always
of paramount importance."
83
Ohio Const. art. IV § 5(A)(I) reads:
In addition to all other powers vested by this article in the Supreme court, the Supreme court shall
have general superintendence over all courts in the state. Such general superintending power shall
be exercised by the chief justice in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme court.
8
4ld. However, unlike rules of procedure and practice, which supercede existing or subsequent legislation
under sec. 5(B), rules of superintendence will not invalidate any statute. They are derived from Sec. 5(A)(1)
of art. IV of the Ohio Constitution, not 5 (B). State v. Lacy, 46 Ohio App. 2d 215, 348 N.E.2d 381 (1975).
8" Preface to the Rules of Superintendence, which reads in part:
It is to be remembered that the courts are created not for the convenience or benefit of the judges
and lawyers, but to serve the litigants and the public at large.
86
C.P.Sup.R. 65 (1) (Baldwin 1987).
87
88

Committee Comments to C.P.Su.R. 65.
1d.

89

C.P.Sup.R. 65 (1)(A)(1) (Baldwin 1987) and OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 120-1-10 (A)(1)(a).
C.P.SupR. 65 (I)(A)(2)(a) (Baldwin 1987) and (I)(A)(3)(A); and, OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 120-1-10 (A)(l)(b)
and (c).
91C.P.SuP.R. 65 (1)(A)(2)(b) (Baldwin 1987) and OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 120-1-10 (A)(1)(b).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss4/7
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and specific criminal court experience 2 C.P.Sup.R. 65 additionally requires
that at least one attorney (at both the trial and appellate levels) maintain an
office in Ohio 93 and that the lead counsel "have had some specialized training
94
in the defense of persons accused of capital crimes.
The requirements for co-counsel are identical in the Rule and the Administrative Code.9 5 Each requires criminal or civil trial experience, or at least
96
specialized training for defending persons accused of capital crimes.
If an attorney does not meet the minimum requirements under C.P.Sup.R.
65, the court-appointed attorney requirements may be waived for that particular
case if an Oversight Committee majority is convinced that the defendant will
receive competent legal representationY 7 The Administrative Code allows for
the trial judge to decide whether to permit an attorney, who does not meet the
Administrative Code requirements, to represent an indigent defendant.9 8 The
Ohio Public Defender Commission has the power, under the Administrative
Code, to refuse to approve reimbursement to the county for the court-appointed
counsel.9 9 Now, under C.PSup.R. 65, the trial judge no longer has the authority to determine if an attorney, who does not meet the minimum requirements
set forth in the Rule, may represent an indigent defendant in a capital case.
Only the Oversight Committee has the authority to waive the qualification
requirements.
Ohio Administrative Code Section 120-1-10 recommends that at least two
attorneys should represent a single defendant. 0 0 C.P.Sup.R. 65 mandates that
two attorneys be court-appointed to appeals cases.' 0' Both appellate attorneys
must be admitted to the Ohio bar, or admitted to practice pro hac vice. 0 2 Both
attorneys must have three years litigation experience0 3 and have "adequate
criminal appellate, post-conviction or habeas corpus experience commensurate
' 04
with the appellate responsibilities of a capital case."'
The second part of C.P.Sup.R. 65 establishes the Oversight Committee. 0 5
92 C.P.SuP.R.
93 C.P.SuP.R.
94C.P.SuP.R.
95
C.P.SuP.R.
96
C.P.Sup.R.
97
C.P.SuP.R.

65 (l)(A)(2)(d) (Baldwin 1987) and OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 120-1-10 (A)(l)(b).
65 (I)(A)(1) (Baldwin 1987) and OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 120-1-10 (B)(1).
65 (1)(A)(2)(c) (Baldwin 1987).
65 (I)(A)(3) (Baldwin 1987) and OHIO ADMIN. CODE § (A)(I)(c).
65 (1)(A)(3)(b) (Baldwin 1987) and OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 120-1-10 (A)(I)(c)(vi).
65 (1)(A)(4) (Baldwin 1987).

98

OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 120-1-10 (A)(l)(d).

99

0HIo ADMIN. CODE § 120-1-10 (A)(I)(e).

'

00

OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 120-1-10 (A)(6)(a).

01

C.P.SuP.R. 65 (II)(B)(I) (Baldwin 1987).
10 2C.P.SuP.R. 65 (1)(B)(1) (Baldwin 1987).
10 3C.P.SuP.R. 65 (1)(B)(2)(b) (Baldwin 1987).
10 4C.P.SuP.R. 65 (II)(B)(I) (Baldwin 1987).
' 05 C.P.Sup.R. 65 (1)(A) (Baldwin 1987).
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The five-member Oversight Committee is selected by the Ohio Supreme Court,
the O.S.B.A. and the Ohio Public Defender Commission. 0 6 Each member must
be an attorney 10 7 who is a member of the Ohio bar.'0 8 The appointed member
must have performed criminal work for at least five years' 0 9 and have
demonstrated a knowledge of the law and practice of capital cases.'"0 The appointed member cannot be a prosecuting attorney or similar employee of any
court.' Each position lasts for five years." 2 The Oversight Committee itself
cannot be composed of more than three members of the same political party. 11
In order to ensure state-wide participation in the Oversight Committee, no more
than two members can reside in the same county." 4 The Oversight Committee
is required to meet at least four times a year." 5
The Oversight Committee's main function is to determine which attorneys
are eligible to represent indigent defendants in capital cases 1 6 and to provide
a list of all eligible attorneys to the proper appointing courts." 7 Each county
is provided one list dividing the attorneys into categories of lead counsel, cocounsel and appeals counsel." 8 C.P.Sup.R. 65 also calls on the Oversight Committee to develop criteria and procedures that include "some form of mandatory
9
continuing legal education in the defense of capital cases.""1
The Committee Comments to C.P.Sup.R. 65 indicate the limitations of the
Oversight Committee's authority and power: "However, the [Oversight] Committee shall not attempt to interfere with the conduct of a particular case, nor
seek to remove counsel over the objection of the attorney and client. . . Removal
of counsel from representation therefore should not occur unless the attorney
and client agree to a substitute counsel."' 20
2
Part II of C.P.Sup.R. 65 sets procedural guidelines for appointing counsel.' '
The Oversight Committee must be notified within two weeks after the court
106C.P.SuP.R.
and one each
10 7C.P.SuP.R.
108 C.P.SuP.R.
0o9C.P.Sup.R.

65 (I1)(A)(1) (Baldwin 1987): There are three selections made by the Ohio Supreme Court
made by the O.S.B.A and the Ohio Public Defender Office.
65 (II)(A)(I) (Baldwin 1987); There is a one judge limit. C.P.SuP.R. 65 (II)(A)(3)(c).
65 (II)(A)(2)(a) (Baldwin 1987).
65 (Il)(A)(2)(b) (Baldwin 1987).

"oC.P.SuP.R.

65 (11)(A)(2)(c) (Baldwin 1987).

M C.P.SuPR. 65 (11)(A)(2)(d) (Baldwin 1987).
"2C.P.SuP.R. 65 (II)(A)(4) (Baldwin 1987).
1"3C.P.SUP.R. 65 (ll)(A)(3)(a) (Baldwin 1987).
1t4C.P.SuP.R. 65 (A)(3)(b) (Baldwin 1987).
"15C.P.Sup.R. 65 (11)(A)(5) (Baldwin 1987).
116 Id.

"'Committee Comments to C.P.SuP.R. 65 (II),
8

11 Id.
9
"1 C.P.SuP.R. 65 (II)(A)(5)(d) (Baldwin 1987).
120 Committee Comments to C.P.SuP.R. 65 (II),
1'2C.PSuPR. 65 (Ill) (Baldwin 1987).
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appoints counsel. 122 The court must also notify the Oversight Committee Chairman in writing of the outcome of the trial 123 and, if the death sentence was
imposed, provide information concerning the appointment of counsel for the
appeal. 24 In addition, the appointing judge is required to provide support services to the counsel as Ohio law or the United States Constitution require. 25
Part III of C.P.Sup.R. 65 also states that appointed counsel's workload cannot
26
be so excessive that it impairs the counsel's ability to represent the defendant.
CONCLUSION

Mandatory qualifications for court-appointed counsel can only help to ensure effective representation will be provided for indigent defendants charged
with capital crimes. Compulsory continuing legal education will increase the
competency of defense attorneys who deal in the difficult world of death penalty
cases. The Ohio Public Defender Commission offers Criminal Law Seminars
at no cost to attorneys who provide free representation in one criminal case
per year. 27 Ohio appears to be taking the lead in ensuring quality representa1 28
tion to indigent defendants.
C.P.Sup.R. 65, however, should not be mistaken as the standardof representation to which court-appointed counsel is expected to maintain. Merely meeting
the qualification standards in C.P.Sup.R. 65 is not enough. It is only the starting point from which indigent defendants charged with capital crimes can hope
to have their slice of due process that is guaranteed by the Ohio and United
States Constitutions.
GEORGE J.

TICoRAS

122 C.P.SuP.R.
12 3C.P.Sup.R.
124 C.P.SuP.R.
' 25 C.P.SuP.R.

65 (I1)(B)(l) (Baldwin 1987).
65 (II1)(B)(2) (Baldwin 1987).
65 (II1)(B)(2)(e) (Baldwin 1987).
65 (II1)(C) (Baldwin 1987).
12 6
C.P.SuP.R. 65 (III)(A) (Baldwin 1987).
127
0hio Public Defender Commission Press Release (Oct. 15, 1987).
121See supra note 16.
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APPENDIX
AMENDMENTS

To THE

SUPREME COURT RULES OF SUPERINTENDENCE

FOR COURTS OF COMMON PLEAS*

The Rules of Superintendence for Courts of Common Pleas were amended,
effective October 14, 1987, as follows:
RULE

65

Qualificationfor Eligibility to be Court-appointed Counsel for Indigent
Defendants Charged with a Capital Offense in the Courts of Ohio
A. Trial Counsel:
(1) At least two attorneys must be court-appointed to represent an indigent
defendant charged with a capital offense. At least one of the appointed
counsel must maintain a law office in the State of Ohio and have experience in Ohio criminal trial practice.
The counsel appointed shall be designated "lead counsel" and
"4co-counsel."

(2) Court-appointed "Lead Counsel" must:
a. Be admitted to the Ohio Bar or admitted to practice pro hac vice; and
b. Have at least three years of litigation experience, criminal or civil; and
c. Have had some specialized training in the defense of persons accused
of capital crimes; and
d. Have at least one of the following qualifications (i to iv):
i. Experience as "lead counsel" in the jury trial of at least one
capital case;
ii. Experience as "co-counsel" in the trial of at least two
capital cases;
iii. Experience as "co-counsel" in the trial of a capital case; and
- Experience as "lead counsel" in the jury trial of at least one
murder or aggravated murder case; or
- Experience as "lead counsel" in ten or more criminal or civil
jury trials, at least three of which were felony jury trials; or

*

Reporter's Note: The Rules of Superintendence for Courts of Common Pleas appear in 29 and 59 Ohio
2d and 2, 9, 13, 16, 21, 24, 33 Ohio St. 3d. 12

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss4/7
St. 2d. Amendments appear in 36, 51, 52, 56, 58,68 Ohio St.
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iv. Experience as "lead counsel" in at least:
- Three murder or aggravated murder jury trials; or
- One murder or aggravated murder jury trial and three felony
jury trials; or
- Three aggravated or first- or second-degree felony jury trials in
a Common Pleas Court within the past three years, at least one
of which shall have involved a charge of a violent crime.
(3) Court-appointed "Co-Counsel" must:
a. Be admitted to the Ohio Bar or admitted to practice pro hac vice;
b. Have at least one of the following qualifications:
i. Qualify as "lead counsel" under (A)(2) above;
ii. Experience as "lead" or "co-counsel" in a capital case;
iii. Experience as "co-counsel" in one murder or aggravated
murder trial;
iv. Experience as "lead counsel" in one first-degree felony jury trial;
v. Experience as "lead" or "co-counsel" in at least two felony jury
or civil jury trials in Common Pleas Court; or
vi. Specialized training in the defense of persons accused of
capital crimes.
(4) Exceptional Circumstances
If an attorney does not meet the qualification requirements of
paragraphs (A)(2) or (A)(3) above, the attorney may still be courtappointed "lead" or "co-counsel" at trial if it can be demonstrated
to the satisfaction of the majority of the Committee (See II of this Rule)
that competent representation will be provided to the defendant. In determining whether an attorney may be qualified under this paragraph, the
Committee may consider the following:
a. Experience in the trial of criminal cases;
b. Specialized post-graduate training in jury trials;
c. Specialized training in the defense of persons accused of capital
crimes;
d. Any other relevant considerations.
(5) As used in this Rule, "trial" means a case concluded with a Criminal
Rule 29 judgment of acquittal or submission to the trial court or jury
for decision and verdict.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1988
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Appellate Counsel:
(1) At least two attorneys must be court-appointed to appeal cases where
the court has ordered the death penalty and where trial counsel has
been granted leave to withdraw or supplemental counsel is being appointed. Both counsel must possess adequate criminal appellate, postconviction, or habeas corpus experience commensurate with the
appellate responsibilities of a capital case. At least one of the appointed
counsel must maintain a law office in Ohio.
(2) Both Appellate Counsel must:
a. Be admitted to the Ohio Bar or admitted to practice pro hac vice;
b. Have three years of litigation experience; and
c. i. Have experience as counsel in the appeal of a case where the
death penalty was the sentence; or
ii. Have experience as counsel in the appeal of at least three felony
convictions within the past three years and have specialized training in the trial or appeal of cases in which the death penalty
was the sentence.
(3) Exceptional Circumstances:
If any attorney does not meet the qualification requirements of
paragraph (B)(2) above, the attorney may still be court-appointed appellate counsel if it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of a majority
of the Committee (See II of this Rule) that competent representation
will be provided to the capitally convicted and sentenced indigent defendant. In so determining, the Committee may consider the following:
a. Specialized training in the trial or appeal of cases in which the death
penalty may be imposed;
b. Experience in the trial or appeal of criminal or civil cases;
c. Any other relevant considerations.
COMMITTEE COMMENTS

These minimum qualifications for counsel appointed in capital cases closely
track the current criteria used for such appointments by the Ohio Public Defender
Commission set out in Ohio Adm. Code 120-1-10. These qualifications have
gained wide acceptance by the trial courts of this State. However, the standards
promulgated by the Ohio Public Defender Commission are not mandatory upon
the courts, and therefore the qualifications of a significant number of counsel
appointed to capital cases do not meet the minimum expected standard. Standards adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court would be universally accepted and
mandatory on all courts in Ohio.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss4/7
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The proposed minimum standards for eligibility to be court-appointed
counsel for indigent capital defendants are recommended for adoption in recognition of and in response to the risks of having inexperienced, ill-prepared counsel
appointed to represent persons charged with capital crimes, thereby risking that
an innocent person may be convicted or that one convicted of a capital crime
may be inappropriately sentenced to death. Further, the proposed Rule seeks
to advance the right of the defendant convicted and sentenced to death to qualified
appellate counsel.
These minimum qualifications would apply only to court-appointed counsel.
The fact that an attorney meets the minimum qualifications to be courtappointed counsel for indigent capital defendants cannot be the sole criterion
in assessing the effectiveness of such counsel in a particular case. When a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised, even the actions of those attorneys
appearing to possess the necessary skill and knowledge must be judged by the
usual standards. Compliance with this Rule cannot, nor is it expected to,
eliminate the occasional validity of such claims.
COMMITTEE ON TIE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS IN CAPITAL CASES

A. The Committee on the Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Defendants
in Capital Cases is hereby created.
(1) Selection of Committee Members:
The Committee shall be composed of five attorneys. Three members
of the Committee shall be selected by a majority vote of all members
of the Supreme Court of Ohio; one shall be selected by the Ohio State
Bar Association; and, one shall be selected by the Ohio Public Defender
Commission.
(2) Eligibilityfor Appointment to the Committee:
a. Member of the Ohio Bar;
b. Represented criminal defendants for not less than five (5) years;
c. Demonstrates a knowledge of the law and practice of capital cases;
d. Currently not a prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village
solicitor, or similar officer or their assistant or employee, nor an
employee of any court.
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The goal in providing defense services in capital cases should be to assure
high quality legal representation to persons unable to afford counsel. The
caseload of an attorney receiving assignments pursuant to these standards should,
therefore, permit him to provide each client with the time and effort necessary
to ensure effective representation. See Ohio Adm. Code 120-1-07. As the
American Bar Association has noted:
"One of the single most significant impediments to the furnishing of quality
defense services for the poor is the presence of excessive workloads. All too
often in defender organizations attorneys are asked to provide representation
in too many cases. Unfortunately, not even the most able and industrious lawyers
can provide quality representation when their workloads are unmanageable.
Excessive workloads, moreover, lead to attorney frustration, disillusionment
by clients, and weakening of the adversary system." ABA Standards, 5-4.3,
Comm., at 5.48.
Judges making appointments should distribute assignments in light of each
attorney's duties under the Code of Professional Responsibility not to accept
"employment ...when he is unable to render competent service . . . ." Code
of Professional Responsibility EC 2-29, or to handle cases "without preparation adequate in the circumstances." Id. at DR 6-O1(A)(2). Similarly, attorneys
should be admonished not to accept more assignments than they can reasonably
discharge, ABA Standards, 4-1.2(d), or accept a client where the representation will be materially limited by the attorney's responsibilities to another client
or to a third person, Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (1983).
In accordance with these principles, judges are urged to assess the private
practice and death penalty workloads of eligible attorneys to determine whether
the workloads are excessive. To assist in assessing workloads, some defender
officers have established caseload guidelines which are useful in determining
whether the workload of a particular attorney is excessive. Judges should limit
the number of assignments per attorney to an appropriate level consistent with
the lawyer's ability to provide each client with quality representation in accordance with constitutional and professional standards.
A recent capital case reaffirms that fundamental fairness entitles indigent
defendants to the "basic tools of an adequate defense." Ake v. Oklahoma (1985),
470 U.S. 68, 77, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1094, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53, 62. In Ake the United
States Supreme*Court stated that:
"We recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse doors does
not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and that a
criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent
defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw materials inhttp://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss4/7
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We reiterate the proposition adopted by other national standards on defense

.services that quality representation cannot be rendered by assigned counsel unless
the lawyers have available for their use adequate supporting services. These
services may include:

"... expert witnesses capable of testifying at trial and at other proceedings,
personnel skilled in social work and related disciplines to provide assistance
at pretrial release hearings and at sentencings, and trained investigators to interview witnesses and to assemble demonstrative evidence." ABA Standards,
5-1.4, Comm., at 5.19-5.20; See, also, Ohio R.C. 2929.024.
It is critical, therefore, for courts to authorize sufficient funds to enable
counsel in capital cases to conduct a thorough investigation for the trial and

sentencing phases, and to procure the necessary expert witnesses and documentary evidence.
Resources available to appointed capital defense counsel should be equivalent
to yet independent of, those available to the prosecution.
(3) Overall Composition:
The overall composition of the Committee shall meet the following
criteria:
a. No more than three members shall be registered members of the
same political party;
b. No more than two members shall reside in the same county; and
c. No more than one shall be a judge.
(4) Initial Appointments, Terms, Vacancies:
Initial appointments to the Committee shall be made by the respective appointing authorities (listed in [A] above) within forty-five days
of the effective date of this Rule.
Of the three initial appointments to be made by a majority vote of
all members of the Supreme Court of Ohio, one shall be for a term
of five years, one for a term of two years, and one for a term of one year.
The Ohio State Bar Association's initial appointment shall be for a
term of four years.
The Ohio Public Defender Commission's initial appointment shall
be for a term of three years.
Thereafter, the term of office for each member shall be five (5) years,
each term ending on the same day of the same month as did the term
in which it succeeds.
When a vacancy occurs (at the expiration of a term, or by a member's
voluntary resignation), the authority who appointed the departing
member of the Committee
shall appoint the successor to office. Any 17
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member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the expiration
of a term shall hold office for the remainder of the term. Any member
shall continue in office subsequent to the expiration date of the term
until a successor takes office or until a period of sixty (60) days has
elapsed, whichever occurs first.
(5) Powers and Duties of the Committee:
The Committee shall:
a. Draft, and at least once per year notify the Bar of, the procedures
for applying for inclusion on the list(s) of those eligible to be courtappointed counsel for indigent capital defendants;
b. Provide all municipal, county, common pleas, and appellate court
judges and the Ohio Public Defender with the list of all attorneys
who meet the qualifications for eligibility to be court-appointed
counsel for indigent defendants charged with a capital offense in the
courts of Ohio, and who may therefore receive court appointments
to defend or appeal capital cases;
c. Periodically review the lists, all court appointments given to attorneys
in capital cases, and the result and status of those cases;
d. Develop criteria and procedures for retention on or deletion from
lists of eligible counsel including, but not limited to, some form of
mandatory continuing legal education on the defense of capital cases;
e. Expand, reduce, or otherwise modify the lists of qualified attorneys
as it deems appropriate and necessary in accord with item d above.
f. Sponsor or co-sponsor specialized training on the defense of capital
cases with organizations such as local bar associations, the Ohio
State Bar Association, and the Ohio Public Defender Commission;
and
g. If and when deemed appropriate, recommend to the Ohio Supreme
Court amendments to this Rule.
(6) Meetings:
Meetings shall be called by written notice of at least one month given
to all members either by the Chairman, and three (3) members of the
Committee, or at the request of the Ohio Supreme Court. The Committee shall meet at least once every three (3) months. A quorum will
consist of three members. A majority of the entire Committee is necessary for the Committee to select a Chairman and take any other action.
(7) Compensation:
All members of the Committee shall receive equal compensation in
an amount to be established by the Ohio Supreme Court.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss4/7
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The Committee on the Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Defendants
in Capital Cases is established to improve the qualify of legal representation
given to such defendants. This state-wide Committee will compile lists of attorneys eligible for such court appointments. All municipal, county, common
pleas, and appellate judges shall receive the lists of all attorneys eligible for
appointments in their jurisdiction and in all adjacent jurisdictions. Judges may
also be provided, either upon request or upon the initiative of the Committee,
any or all other lists of eligible attorneys from other jurisdictions within the
State. There will be only one list per county. Each list will be categorized according to eligibility as:
1. "lead counsel";
2. "co-counsel"; and
3. "appellate counsel."
The Committee may also perform related administrative duties.
The members of the Committee should be members of the Bar, as this
tends to assure an understanding of a lawyer's professional duties and responsibilities and an awareness of needs and problems inherent in these matters.
Similarly, because of the unique aspects of defending defendants charged with
capital offenses, it is appropriate for all of the Committee members to have
not only a general background in criminal defense, but also a working knowledge
of the issues involved in litigating a death penalty case.
An effective means of securing professional independence for assigned
counsel is to place responsibility for the decisions concerning the qualifications of assigned counsel in a Committee whose members are themselves free
to act as dictated by their best professional judgment. Consequently, it is recommended that the membership of the Committee not include prosecutors or more
than one judge. These restrictions are necessary to "remove any implication
that defense attorneys under the system are subject to the control of those who
appear as their adversaries or before whom they must appear in the representation of defendants, except judges as charged with the disciplinary supervision of all members of the bar." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2 Ed.
1980), 5-1.3, Commentary, at 5.17-5.18. (Hereinafter "ABA Standards.") See,
also, California Standing Committee on Delivery of Legal Services to Criminal
Defendants, Report on the Independence of the Criminal Defense Bar and Standards Relating to Professional Competence of Appointed Counsel (1980), at 3-4.
Qualifications and procedures for eligibility will be written and publicized
in a manner which encourages participation from a large number of attorneys
throughout Ohio and attracts public interest. Public awareness and trust in
assigned-counsel programs is essential if they are to be financed adequately
effectively.1988ABA Standards, 5-1.5, Comm.
and byoperated
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Applications for eligibility and the review thereof should include the attorney's experience, training and demonstrated qualifications. Information may
also be provided by judges before whom the applicant has appeared, and by
others familiar with the applicant's professional abilities.
The Committee will monitor the performance of assigned counsel and consider whether counsel has met the basic responsibilities of a trial or appellate
lawyer. If counsel has clearly not done so, his name shall be removed from
the list.
However, the Committee shall not attempt to interfere with the conduct
of a particular case, nor seek to remove counsel over the objection of the attorney and client. In order to preserve the nature of the attorney-client relationship, counsel for the accused must have total freedom to represent their
clients as they deem professionally appropriate. Clients, moreover, should have
the right to continue satisfactory relationships with their appointed lawyers in
whom they have reposed their confidence and trust. Removal of counsel from
representation therefore should not occur unless the attorney and client agree
to a substitute counsel. Where the assigned lawyer is unable to provide effective representation due to a mental or physical impairment it is the court's responsibility to intervene.
It is critical that the Committee ensure that comprehensive training programs which focus on criminal defense advocacy, with particular emphasis on
capital cases, be regularly offered throughout the State. Required continuing
legal education should enhance trial practice skills and instruct on the current
law relating to death penalty cases.
I.

PROCEDURES FOR COURT APPOINTMENTS OF COUNSEL

A. Appointing Counsel:
All municipal, county, common pleas, and appellate courts within the State
shall appoint counsel to represent indigent defendants charged with a capital
offense in accordance with Section I of this Rule. Each court shall be free to
adopt local rules requiring qualifications in addition to the mandatory minimum
requirements established by this Rule. The appointing court shall not assign,
and counsel shall not accept, an appointment which creates a total workload
so excessive that it interferes with or effectively prevents the rendering of quality
representation in accordance with constitutional and professional standards. Appointments of counsel for these cases should be distributed as widely as possible among the eligible members of the Bar in an appointing court's jurisdiction. An appointing court shall, whenever possible, appoint at least one eligible attorney who routinely practices in that court's jurisdiction. When no one
is available and it is necessary or in the interests of justice appropriate to do
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss4/7
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so, the court may appoint counsel from another jurisdiction, preferably at least
one of whom has had experience in the appointing court's jurisdiction.
B.

Notice to the Committee:
(1) Within two weeks of appointment, the appointing court shall notify
the Committee Chairman of the appointment. The written notice shall
include:
a. The court and the judge assigned to the case;
b. The full case name and number;
c. A copy of the indictment;
d. The names, business addresses, phone numbers, and, if applicable,
status ("lead" or "co-counsel") of all attorneys appointed; and
e. If none of the attorneys appointed maintains a law office or regular
practice in the appointing court's jurisdiction, why their appointment was deemed necessary.
(2) The appointing court shall further notify the Committee Chairman,
in writing, of the ultimate disposition of the case within one week of
final disposition. The notice shall include:
a. The title and section of the Revised Code of all crime(s) of which
the defendant plead and/or was found guilty;
b. The date sentence was rendered;
c. The court's sentence;
d. A copy of the court's entry reflecting the above; and
e. A statement concerning the appointment of counsel for the appeal,
if the death penalty was imposed or if the defendant requested appointment of counsel for an appeal.

C. Support Services:
The appointing court shall provide appointed counsel, as required by Ohio
law or the federal Constitution, federal statutes, and professional standards,
with the investigator(s), social worker(s), mental health professional(s), or other
forensic experts and other support services reasonably necessary or appropriate
for counsel to prepare and present an adequate defense at every stage of the
proceedings - before, during and after trial - including, but not limited to,
determinations relevant to competency to stand trial, a Not Guilty by Reason
of Insanity plea, cross-examination of expert witnesses called by the prosecution, disposition following conviction, and preparation for the sentencing phase
of the trial.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1988

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 21 [1988], Iss. 4, Art. 7

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss4/7

22

